Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 21
Issue 1
Symposium: Comparative Models of Privatization:
Paradigms and Politics

Article 3

9-1-1995

Commentary
Alice Pezard

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Alice Pezard, Commentary, 21 Brook. J. Int'l L. 85 (1995).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol21/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

THE GOLDEN SHARE OF PRIVATIZED
COMPANIES
Alice Pezard"
Over the last ten years, various European, Asian and
South American countries have conducted privatization programs. This general trend furthers the global application of
privatization techniques, not least because of the weight of
foreign investors.
Having learned from the British experience in the 1980s,
France adopted certain British and American concepts, including the golden share. Used during the privatization of British
Aerospace and British Telecom, this special share, reserved for
the government, provides a legal instrument for fighting off
takeovers of strategically important privatized companies.
The golden share was introduced in French law by Act 86912 of August 6, 1986, Section 10, on the privatization conditions for the sixty-five national enterprises listed in Act 86-793
of July 2, 1986, authorizing the government to take various
economic and social measures. Section 7 of Act 99-923 of July
19, 1993, preserves and refines this legal instrument, originally adopted for a five-year term.
The recent refinements have turned this copy of the British golden share into a real French golden share.
I. CREATION OF THE GOLDEN SHARE

Transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector
is a delicate operation. The government does not merely sell
property or know-how. During privatization transactions, it is
charged with protecting national interests and preserving national independence.
A. ProtectingNational Interests
Section 10 of the Act of August 6, 1986 (modified), stipulates that an ordinary share must be converted into a golden
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share when necessary to protect national interests. However,
national interests are defined in neither the Act of July 19,
1993, nor in the Conseil d'Etat Decree No 93-1296 on the application of Section 10 of the Act of August 6, 1986. Moreover,
it isn't easy to distinguish between this concept and the concept of national independence.
While the definition is not entirely clear, national interests
are apparently juxtaposed with foreign interests. This notion is
confirmed by Senate Advisory No. 345, presented on behalf of
the Commission of Constitutional laws (second ordinary session of 1992-1993), which refers to securities sold to individuals or legal entities who are not members of the European
Union or who are under non-EU control. Such individuals or
legal entities may not own more than 20% of the capital of a
privatized company. This threshold may be lowered by the
Minister of the Economy "when necessary to protect national
interests." The Senate Advisory also warns against the acquisition by foreign nationals of over five percent of enterprises
whose core business contributes "to the exercise of public authority," whose special status is justified "by reasons of State,
national security and national health," or activities "producing
or trading arms, munitions and defense equipment," pursuant
to Sections 55, 56 and 223 of the Treaty of Rome.
There are however, signs that some parties within the
government would like to limit the protection of national interests from foreign ownership. Report No. 326 (1992-1993), prepared for the Senate Finance Committee, proposed to abolish
the 20% ceiling on interests held by foreign nationals. Although limiting protection of national interests, this report also
extended the scope of the golden share based on the principle
of national independence.
B. PreservingNational Independence
Constitutional Council ruling No 86-207 of June 25-26,
1986, on the Act authorizing government to take various economic and social measures, states that national independence
must be preserved. National independence is not a strictly
defined legal concept. More restrictive than the concept of
national interests, national independence is invoked to preserve the golden share when the activities of a company concerned are tied to strategies which are vital to national sover-
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eignty.
For the moment, the Constitutional Council has made
neither an effort to define the concept of national independence, nor was this aspect taken up in the Conseil d'Etat decision of February 7, 1987, on the 1986 partial privatization of
Elf-Aquitaine. The concept of national independence is, however, covered by Section 16 of the French Constitution, which
lays down the exceptional powers of the President of the Republic.
The concept appears to cover activities linked to national
defense (armament industry), economic protection (oil supplies,
cf., the declaration of the President of the Republic of July 14,
1993, on the privatization of Elf-Aquitaine) and possibly national transportation and infrastructures (airlines, railroads,
etc.). The government may also base its stance on other applicable texts. For instance, several texts permit close government control of the armament industry. Moreover, the decree
of October 30, 1935, provides for permanent or temporary control by a government representative over any enterprise having
won a defense equipment contract.
The Statutory Orders of April 18, 1939 (modified), on the
reform of the defense equipment, arms, and munitions industries, require defense equipment makers or traders to be authorized by the Minister of Defense. Such authorization is
granted solely to enterprises owned by French partners and
managed by individuals who are French nationals. Section 238
of the Public Contract Code stipulates that government contractors for defense equipment are governed by the strict rules
of the Public Contract Code and to the inspections stipulated
by the laws and regulations governing defense equipment,
arms and munitions. Lastly, decree No 90-58 of January 15,
1990, on the regulation of direct foreign investments, stipulates that all investments in production of or trading in defense equipment activities require authorizations by the
Ministry of the Economy. In accordance with Community Principles, the regulations on direct foreign investments lay down
general restrictions, notably in case of capital market upheavals.
In other areas, such as oil supplies, the government has
legal instruments with which to preserve national independence. Forfeiture of voting rights for shareholders who violate
these mechanisms remain in effect.
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II. CREATION OF THE GOLDEN SHARE

A. Creation by Decree
Under Section 10, paragraph 2 of the Act of August 6,
1986, the Minister of the Economy was charged with ruling
whether the protection of national interests required the creation of the golden share. The procedure enacted by the Act of
July 19, 1993, calls for the adoption of an ordinary decree for
every enterprise concerned. This is a more strict condition,
reflecting the legislators' intention to involve the ministers concerned, notably the supervisory ministers, more closely in
privatizations.
B. Adoption of Decree Before Referral to PrivatizationCommission
Already enacted by Section 10, paragraph 2 of the Act of
August 6, 1986, and reiterated in Section 7 of the Act in July
19, 1993, the use of the golden share is rooted in the very
mechanism underlying privatization. However, the Privatization Commission is not entitled to suggest whether it is appropriate to create such a golden share.
During the privatizations in 1986 and 1987, ordinary
shares were converted into golden shares. Golden shares were
in fact fully used in the case of MATRA and HAVAS, but only
partly in the case of Elf-Aquitaine and Bull, since these two
enterprises were not privatized but allowed to sell off secondary subsidiaries without authorizations from Parliament (so-

called "respiration"). In 1993, the government refrained from
--creating a golden share for the Banque National de Paris and
Rh6ne-Poulenc. Banque Hervet will probably be exempt as
. well. On the other hand, Elf-Aquitaine's oil and chemical activ-ities have prompted the government to convert its ordinary
share into a golden share.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE GOLDEN SHARE
Section 7 of the Act of July 19, 1993, strengthens the effect
of the golden share stated in Section 10 of the Act of August 6,
1986. The Senate, National Assembly and the Government
have taken a unanimous position. The golden share offers
three types of rights, sometimes tied to penalties. Section 10.1
lists the conditions under which a golden share may be creat-
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ed. Specifically, section 10.1 requires a determination as to
whether the protection of national interests requires the conversion of an ordinary share held by the government into a
golden share tied to all or part of the rights defined below. If
so, the decree also orders the conversion.
Section 10.1 also creates the following additional rules for
the creation and dissolution of the golden share:
Prior approval is required from the Minister of the Economy before a person, acting alone or jointly, may cross one or
more of the thresholds laid down by the decree mentioned in
the first paragraph above and calculated as a percentage of the
share capital or voting rights;
Appointment of one or two government representatives to
the Board of Directors or the Supervisory Board, as applicable,
is required; such representatives are appointed by decree and
have no voting rights;
The right to veto, on conditions stipulated by Conseil
d'Etat decree, decisions to dispose of or pledge assets, if such
would prejudice national interests. The effects of this share are
indelibly tied to its creation.
Except where national independence is concerned, the
golden share may at all times be irrevocably converted by
decree into an ordinary share.
The Minister of the Economy must also approve the acquisition of interests exceeding five percent by foreign individuals
or foreign or foreign-controlled legal entities, in the meaning of
Section 355-1 of Company Act No 66-537 of July 24, 1966,
acting alone or jointly, in those enterprises or subsidiaries
covered by this Chapter whose core business comes under the
Sections 55, 56, and 223 of the Treaty instituting the European
Economic Community.
When interests have been acquired in violation of I.1 or II
of this Section, the holder(s) of the irregularly acquired interests may not exercise the corresponding voting rights and must
sell such shares within three months. Upon expiration of the
three month deadline, the shares are automatically sold by
court order on conditions laid down by decree. The Minister of
the Economy brings such acquisitions to the attention of the
Chairman of the company's Board of Directors or Directorate,
as applicable, who in his turn alerts the next general shareholder meeting.
The provisions of points I and II are also available to the
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privatization of the public sector enterprises mentioned in
paragraph 1 of Section 20.
A. Ownership Thresholds
1. The Application of Thresholds
The Act of July 19, 1993, is more flexible than the Act of
August 6, 1986, which stipulated a threshold of 10% on interests in the meaning of the Act of July 24, 1966. The decree
creating the golden share grants the government a free hand
in setting thresholds. The concept of acquisition of interests is
defined in Section 10.III of the Act.
While British privatizations never applied thresholds below 15% for most of its future privatizations, the French government will probably opt for a threshold below 10%, corresponding to a significant financial investment and control. It is
expected to base ifself on the legal thresholds provided for by
general law, i.e. minimum five percent. Such a threshold is
determined by decree for the entire duration of the golden
share. Whenever an individual or legal entity wishes to cross
this threshold, approval is required.
2. The Authorization of Thresholds
The authorization date is settled by Section 7 of the Act of
August 6 (modified): authorization must be granted before a
threshold is crossed. On the other hand, this law does not
cover the reasons which may cause a shareholder to cross a
threshold, and there are cases in which a larger stake is not
acquired by active investment (e.g., when double voting rights
are granted). In this case, it will be necessary to anticipate
conversion of a single voting right into a double voting right.
However, this should seldom occur, as core shareholder groups
are organized during privatization. Moreover, authorization is
required only for the privatized company itself, unless the
company engages in defense Activities, in which case it is required for the subsidiaries as well as the parent company.
The Minister of the Economy is charged with granting or
refusing the authorization to cross a threshold. In practice, he
needs to decide quickly and clearly in light of the potential
impact of such information on the stock market, notably in
case of an accumulation strategy.
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B. The Power to Appoint One or Two Government
Representatives to the Board of Directors or the Supervisory
Board
Government representatives appointed pursuant to the
golden share are appointed by decree, and are not entitled to
vote. They serve principally as watchdogs over corporate management, acting on behalf of the government. In this way, they
are similar to government officials (commissaires du
gouvernement) who serve a watchdog function in industries
and enterprises legally required to have a government representative on the board (these are organizations such as
SOFICAS, or Soci6ts Financi~res d'Innovations, Soci6t6s de
D~veloppement R6gionales, Organes Centraux de R6seaux de
Credit, etc.). This innovative mechanism gives full effect to the
golden share by allowing the government to be in contact with
company managers without interfering in company management, and by limiting the government to the protection of
national interests (e.g., by the power to veto asset disposal,
without allowing the government to meddle inordinately in the
business operations of the company).
C. The Power to Veto Asset Disposal
Although not true directors in the traditional sense of the
term, the government representatives appointed pursuant to
the golden share have significant powers. One of the most
significant is the power to veto asset disposal. The conditions
on which this new right is exercised are governed by Conseil
d']ttat Implementation Decree No. 33-1296. The Conseil d']Atat
mechanism reserves to the government the to confirm by order
its opposition to undesirable disposal of assets deemed strategic. A decree instituting a golden share includes a list of strategic assets whose disposal may be vetoed by the government.
Plans for the disposal of assets included on this list are declared to the Minister of the Economy. Such a declaration must
be accompanied by all data needed to investigate the case.
A disposal is authorized when the Minister of the Economy
has not vetoed it by order published in Journal Officiel de la
Rdpublique Frangaise,the French government gazette, within
one month from the date of receipt of the complete file, as
attested by the administration. This period may be extended
for fifteen days by order of the Minister of the Economy. Before
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expiration of the period, the Minister of the Economy may
waive his veto right.
Section 3 of the Implementation Decree provides that any
disposal or pledging of listed assets in violation of the decree is
automatically null and void.
The requirement that a list of strategic assets be adopted
has been questioned on several grounds, including whether
such a list is appropriate and whether it is the best form of
protection for the assets in question. These questions come
from the fact that inventory prepared at the time of privatization will reflect a fixed image of national interests, whereas
the enterprise operates in an economic system whose time
factor implies and requires constant adaptation to remain
competitive. For example, given the certainty of obsolescence
by technical progress, what value will a company's patents
have in ten years? What value should be placed on gas and oil
reserves, as well as other consumables? Further complicating
the situation is the fact that assets acquired by the company
after privatization cannot be vetoed even if serving national
interests, as such veto would affect ownership rights of new
shareholders.
Thus, the decision as to which assets will be placed on the
list is a critical to foreign investors. In the future, practice
should show whether a restrictive definition of the assets concerned (i.e., a short list), can overcome likely reservations. If
not, the reaction of French and foreign investors toward this
privatization is an open question, especially because they may
view the privatization as "limited." Whether their attitude will
be cautious, reserved or indifferent, investors will be paying
close attention to the concept of national interest.
IV. PENALTIES

The penalty mechanism provided for in the Act of July 19,
1993 is close to the mechanism enacted in 1986, in regard to
both the behavior punished and the penalties applied.
A. Punished Cases
Section 7 of the Act of 1993 created a penalty mechanism
applicable in two cases:
Where a person, acting alone or jointly, and without prior
approval from the Minister of the Economy, acquires and inter-
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est giving a percentage in the capital or voting rights exceeding the thresholds fixed by decree for each transaction;
Where a foreign or foreign-controlled entity, acting alone
or jointly, without prior approval from the Minister of the
Economy, acquires a 5% interest in the capital of an enterprise
whose core business comes under the Sections 55, 56 and 223
of the Treaty of Rome.
B. Penalties
Holders of interests acquired without approval by the
Minister of the Economy, may not exercise the corresponding
voting rights. Moreover, under Section 10-III of the Act of 1986
(modified), such persons must sell their shares within three
months. Past the deadline of three months, the shares are
automatically sold by court order on conditions laid down by
decree. In addition, the Minister of the Economy is responsible
for alerting the Chairman of the Board of Directors or the
Directorate of such irregular acquisitions. The Chairman must
notify the next general shareholders meeting to ensure that
negligent shareholders cannot exercise their voting rights.
V. LIMITS ON THE GOLDEN SHARE
A. Limits Imposed by the Constitutional Council "Freedom of
Enterprise"Decision of July 4, 1989
The ruling handed down by the Constitutional Council on
the Act of July 10, 1989, clearly stated that the control exercised by the public authorities over the ownership of privatized
enterprises does not affect the freedom of enterprise. The deputies who had drafted the application for the ruling held that
the golden share reserved for the government and enabling the
government to veto acquisitions capable of harming national
interests violated "the freedom to acquire interests in an enterprise and therefore the freedom to take control of such enterprise." Responding to these arguments, the Constitutional
Judge reiterated the principle according to which the "freedom
of enterprise is neither general nor absolute" and that the law
maker is entitled to subject it to "limitations required in the
general interest, provided they do not alter its scope." Holding
that government control over the acquisition of shares in privatized companies is designed to protect the national interest
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and is governed by temporary application rules of limited
scope, the Constitutional Council ruled that this procedure
does not violate the freedom of enterprise.
B. Compliance with European Union Law
In adopting a mechanism to control the acquisition of
shares in privatized companies, the law maker must comply
with two basic principles of Union law, free circulation of capital and nondiscrimination.
1. Free Circulation of Capital
The Court of Justice of the European Union has identified
the free circulation of capital as one of the fundamental freedoms under the Treaty. Its application calls for the adoption of
Union Acts under derived law. Thus, Directive No 88-361 of
June 24, 1988, was designed to organize the liberalization of
capital movements, i.e. financial transactions intended mainly
to place or invest a given amount of money.
The freedom of nationals of EU Member States to acquire
shares in privatized companies aligns with the application of
the principle of free movement of capital. Thus, compliance of
the French privatization act with Union law not only means
that the nationals of an EU Member State must have access to
offerings on the same terms as French individuals, but also
that the golden share created in favor of the government may
not be used to block EU shareholders for other reasons than
protection of national interests.
2. Non-Discrimination
By calling for prior approval by the Minister of the Economy of foreign acquisitions exceeding five percent of the capital
in enterprises tied to national security, national defense or
national health, the legislature aimed to protect national independence. This stipulation could, however, violate the principle
of nondiscrimination in that it specifies stricter control for
foreigners than for French nationals. However, Section 10-II of
the Act of 1986 (modified) refers explicitly to the sectors granted exemptions under the Sections 55, 56 and 223 of the Treaty
of Rome (security, defense, health). Thus, this rule complies
with Union law.

1995]

PEZARD COMMENTARY

VI. THE TEMPORARY NATURE A GOLDEN SHARE
Section 10, paragraph 5 of the Act of August 6, 1986,
states that "the golden share may at all times be irrevocably
converted into an ordinary share by order of the Minister of
the Economy. It is automatically so converted after five years."
In ruling No. 89-254 of July 4, 1989, the Constitutional
Council held that "government control of the acquisition of
shares in privatized companies . . . is intended to protect national interests and is subject to the temporary application of
procedures of limited scope which do not violate the freedom of
enterprise."
Hence, the special treatment of privatized companies,
compared with the general provisions of corporate law, may
not be extended beyond a certain period whose term was not
specified by the Constitutional Council. Section 10-1-3, paragraph 3 (modified), is worded as follows: "Except where national independence is concerned, the golden share may at all
times be irrevocably converted into an ordinary share by decree."
Comparison of the 1986 and 1993 versions shows the withdrawal of a predetermined period, although not without a
bitter fight in parliament. In light of constitutional jurisprudence, the government may not hold indefinitely its golden
share in enterprises not involved with national independence.
Even in the case of such enterprises it must waive its prerogatives in due time.
The ultimate lesson is that the French golden share is not
a threat to the financial markets. The golden share is an instrument in the service of a liberal state disposing of property
which cannot be of use for its sovereign functions, while maintaining a degree of control in order to watch over national
independence. Another purpose of the golden share is to preserve the ownership structure chosen at the time of privatization. Moreover, a mixed commission with equal representation
extended its use to selling off secondary subsidiaries by publicsector enterprises with sales of over one billion French francs
and a staff of over one thousand employees.

